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the lessor from a loss of a
of the income from
he lessee business if it ceased to occupy the
It
a reasonable implication from these provisions that the
upon the same measure of damages when that
loss resulted from an abandonment of the integral purpose
which the lease was made. There was no error in the
award of
The
is affirmed.
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,J., Carter, J.,

Schauer,

alHl Spence, .,T., eonenrred.

A. No. 23133.
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Estate of JOSEPH C. POISh Deceased. EMMA POISL,
Appellant, v. ROBI£Wr L. F'ERGUSON, as Executor,
etc., et al., Hespondents.
[1] Wills- Revocation- Marriage After Making WilL-General

disinheritance clause in will does not constitute mention of
subse<1uently acquired wife in such way as to show intention
not to make provision for her within purview of Prob. Code,
§ 70, declaring that will is revoked by subsequent marriage of
testator unless spouse is provided for or mentioned in wilL
[2] !d.-Revocation-Marriage After Making Will.-Merely namor g1vmg
to woman by name, with no indication
that she may be prospective spouse, is insufficient to prevent
revocation of will as to after-acquired spouse.
[3] !d.-Revocation-Marriage After Making WilL-Contemplation of future marriage must appear on face of will to prevent
revocation of will as to after-acquired spouse, and extrinsic.
evidence is not admissible to show testator's intention, at least
unless there is some ambiguity. (Disapproving Estate of Appenfelcler, 99 Cal.App. 330, 278 P. 473, and Estate of Brannon,
111 CaLApp. 38, 295 P. 83.)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County upholding validity of a wilL Newcomb
Condee, J udgc. Reversed.
[1] Marriage as revoking will, note, 92 A.L.R. 1010. See also
Cal.Jur., Wills, § 151 et seq.; Am.Jur., Wills, § il26 ct seq.
McK. Dig. Reference: [1-3] Wills, § 260.

'rhomas
69

in
''Emmie'' also known as ''Emma Blackburn"
Alhambra; the residue to the two
It also provided
omitted
Poisl died on .rune 16,
'rhe will was admitted to
probate mHl letters
issued. Emma Blackburn
Poisl filed a
to revoke the probate as to her, alleging
that she and Poisl were married on
1951 ( n few days
more than seven months after the will was executed and about
eleven months prior to his
and were husband and wife
at the time of his death.
the court without a jury. The
court found the
facts but that provision was made
reason of the legacy to her by
name
to the
and that hence the -vvill was not
reYoked as io her under seetion 70 of the Pro batt~ Code.*
From the cvidenee it appears that Emma had known Poisl
and he had lived in her house ·when he was in the T~os Angeles
arra; Emma Blackburn and testator's surviving widow are
the
person. The value of the
of
as
the petition for probate of his will, was cash,
the San Diego property devised to Emma, worth
$20,000, and promissory notes for $20,051.87. No evidence
of whether Poisl contemplated
was offered on the
Emma when he made his wilL
[1] Applying seetion 70 of the Probate Code, .mpra, to
the instant case, it is settled that the general disinheritance
~~~'If a
marries after mal<ing a will, and the
survives
the mnker,
will is revoked as to the spouse, unless
has ],een
madp for the
by
contmet, or unless
vidcd for in
will, or in
way mentioned therein as to show an
intention not to make such provision; and no othm evidence to rebut the
presumption of revocation can be received." (Pro b. Code, § 70.)
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not constitute a mention of Emma in
intention not to make
for
23 Cal.2d 761
P.2d 1] .) 'l'he
has been made

clause

spouse. Estate
volyed a clause in a
in
the
in the Axcelrod case, that excluded all persons who may become the testatrix' heirs "by reason of
or otherwise"; that was held sufficient disinheritance to
revocation as to an
spouse. The
of the
Dnke ease is
·while the clause did not disinherit the spouse
hy name, it sho1Yed a
the executrix of a
possibility of
in the future, and the effect that marriage \Vould have upon the will; that
intent to mention a
future spouse and to disinherit him. Thus the Duke ease is
readily
from the ease at bar
that it
does indicate that the will must show a contemplation of a
fnture
on the
of the testator to
with
the fundamental purpose of section 70, whether we are
ing of disin}JCritancc or
the after acquired sponsr. In Estate
Duke, supra, 41 CaL2d
we stated: ''And, although a testator need not make provision
for snch a spouse, he is I'Pquired to bear in mind the
bility of a
marriage and the serious changes in
(lomesiic relations
therefrom. 'fhe
Court
of
said of a similar statute: 'The object of the promoral influence upon the testavision is to seenre a
mrntar.v aet-tho moral inftnenee of having in mind a conevent so momentous as marriage . . . , and so deserving of consideration in
a testamentary scheme.' (Ellis
v. Dnrden, 86 na.
372 [12 S.K 652, 653, 11 L.R.A. 511 :
quoted Yrith
in Estate
S1tpra, p. 292.)"
(See Estate
191 Cal. 307, 311 [216 P. 366]; Estate
of
snpra, 23 Cal.2d 761, 767-768; Corker v. Corker,
87 Cal. 648
P. 922}; Estate
Meyer, 44 Cal.App. 289,
292-293 [1 8£1 P. 393].) [2] It being necessary for the testa-

150

EsTATE ov PorsL

tor to have "in mind" a "momentous" oecasion such as marriage, it follows that
or
to a
person
name, as was done in the ease at
no
indication that she may be a
spouse,
to prevent revocation. [3] 'l'hat i]](]ieation mnst appear 011
the face of the will, and extrinsic evidence is not admissible,
to show the testator's
at least unlec;s there is some
ambiguity. As in the Duke case a
to named person
alone, although the named person
later married to the
testator, creates no
; it is merely "noncommittal"
as were the vwrds "heirs at las•;" in the Duke case.
of Dnke, supra, 41 Cal.2d 509, 515.)
There are cases in other
with statutes similar
. to ours holding that contemplation of a future
mnst
appear on the face of the will to prevent revocation
cases collected 127 A.hR 750). In Estate
,
9fJ Cal.App. 330 [278 P. 473]
also Estate of Brannou,
111 Cal.App. 38 [295 P. 83]) a contrary view was taken bnt
no consideration was given to the
purpose aJH1
policy of section 70 as indicated by the cases heretofor0
cited. 'l'he last cited cases are, therefore, disapprowd.
Defendants argue that the Appenfelder case having bern
decided when the statutory provisions preceding section 70
of the Probate Code were codified in that code, the Legislature
knew thereof and thus approved the interpretation which did
not require that a contemplation of marriage appear on tlw
face of the will, and along the same line contend that tlw
law in force-the rule in the Appenfelder ease-at the timr
the testator made the ·will should be applied. Assuming bnt
not deciding the correetness of the legal propositions inherent
in those contentions, they can have no applieation here because the law of this state was not neeessarily as stated in the
Appenfelder case. This is apparent because in other cases
the reasoning in the Duke case had been applied. (Estate
of 111eycr, 44 Cal.App. 289 [186 P. 393], quoting with approYal
the discussion in Ellis v. Darden, 86 Ga. 368 [12 S.E. 652, 11
hRA. 51], whieh in turn 1ms
in the Duke case;
Estate of Ryan, supra, 191 Cal. 307, 311; Corke1· Y. Corke1·,
supra, 87 Cal. 643.) \Vhilc those cases dealt with the question of disinheritance as distinguished from making provision
for the after-aeq uired spouse, t hrre appears to be no reason
why seetion 70 should be interpreted differently in the one
situation than in the other. (::iee discussion 32 Cal.L.Rev.
213.) The ~Washington cases (In re Steele's Estate, 45 vVn.
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In n· "1 dl rT's Esto.ft, ;)2 Wash. fi!39
upon
defendants, cannot be eonof the above discussed authorities

is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk,
concurred.

Edmonds,

rrraynor, J., and

J.-I dissent.
Section 70 of the Probate Code is clear and unambiguous.
It provides, in
that a will executed before the marriage
of a testator is not revoked by the marriage if "the spouse
is provided for in the wilL'' Emma Blackburn, now Emma
Blackburn Poisl, became the spouse of the testator after the
execution of the will, but the will specifically devised and bequeathed certain real and personal property to her. Therefore she was ''provided for in the will,'' and the marriage
did not effect a revocation.
'l'hose courts ·which have construed provisions similar in
material respects to section 70, have been unwilling to engraft additional requirements upon the clear and unambiguous
language of their statutes, and therefore have held that it
is sufficient that provision be made in a will for a spouse
identified by her maiden name. Nothing need appear in the
will indicating that at the time of its execution the testator
contemplated his marriage to the named beneficiary. (In rc
Steele's Estate, 45 \Vn.2d 58 [273 P.2d 235] ; In re Adler's
Estate, 52 Wash. 539 [100 P. 1019] .) It was so held in a
well-reasoned opinion in Estate of Appenfelder, 99 Cal.App.
330 [278 P. 473], and the Legislature thereafter reenacted
the former section when it adopted the Probate Code.
The majority opinion wonld disapprove the Appenfelder
(~ase by reasoning from a supposed analogy between the
situation here and that presented in certain cases involving
an entirely different provision of the section. (Estate of Duke,
41 Cal.2d 509 [261 P.2d 235] ; Estate of Axcelrod, 23 Cal.2d
761 [147 P.2d 1] .) The last-mentioned provision declares that
the will is not revoked if the spouse is ''in such way mentioned
therein as to show an intention not to make such provision.''
In other words, that portion of the section deals solely with
the subject of intentional disinheritance; and the last cited
cases deal with situations where the spouse was neither ''provided for" or "mentioned" by name in the will. There is
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Contracts- Modification- Oral Modification of Written
Contract.-Civ.
§

may be altered
agn'emPnt, presupposP~
and acafter
docs not inntlidate new oral
written contract has
by its terms or has
cancelled or rescinded.
[2] Master and Servant-Contracts of Employment-Termination.
-\Vritten contract for
of
for one year
for stnted salary plus percentage of profits of defendant's
business terminates at end of year unless parties agree that
it shall continue.
l3] !d.-Contracts of Employment-Renewal of Agreement.-Fact
that
continues in defendant's
after euJ of year
in written contract of
for one ycrrn·
standing alone, that parties
to continuation
of written contract.
Lab. Code, §
[ 4] !d.-Contracts of Employment-Compensation-Evidence.-In
nction to recover
to be clue undPr terms of oral
extension of writtPn contract of
for one year
prodding for stated
sum
when added to
would Pqual 30 prr cent of net
of ddt>ndant's
evidencr that plaintiff continued in def(•ndant's employ after end of year in reliance on defPndant's promise that
See Cal.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 181 ct seq.; Am.Jur., Contracts,
§ 1128.
McK. Dig. References:
§ 29;

s

52;
1\Iaster and
~ 6;
[10] Master and Servant, §53.
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